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ABSTRACT.
New Towns ought to deal effectively with solving some the urban
problems in LDCs,in particular by absorbing the population of
cities through the provision of housing. One advantage is that
the concept usually entails large-scale, inter-sectorial, and
economic planning which may benefit the entire country.
However,they are much too expensive for LDCs. Sites and services
offer a cost-effective alternative in the provision of low-income
housing for poor urban dwellers and have proven a replicable
strategy.
This study is concerned with the compilation of information and
facts on some of the principles and premises behind the
utilization of new towns and the sites and services concept, as
an alternative development strategy, in the lesser developed
countries'context. The advantages and disadvantages of both
concept are examined to see to what extent either may be more
appropriate for LDCs presently, given the scarcity of funds.
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FOCUS OF PAPER
National urban policies of many developing countries call for
the creation of new towns on the out-skirts of their major or
capital cities. The new towns are sometimes used as planning
solutions to diffuse the growth of the "Primate Cities" in these
countries, and provide badly needed housing, services, and
infrastructure for the rapidly increasing urban population.
Another reason, although perhaps unique to Egypt, for the
construction of new towns is the preservation of scarce fertile
land for agriculture. Egypt had to study in detail the costs
involved and the goals they were trying to achieve, then decide
whether or not creating new towns was the best decision.
However, new towns are very expensive. Successful
decentralization schemes, using new towns, usually involve
massive infrastructure investments and heavy initial
subsidization, requiring the kind of funds that developing
countries typically lack.
In this paper I have attempted to evaluate the options of
either developing new towns or just simply providing the same
services Einstitutions, services and infrastructure3 to the
metropolitan area in the Developing Countries context.
Specifically, I am concerned with the issue of housing for the
urban low income population, and how their needs can be best met
by either of the two options. Within the context of extending
the metropolitan area, by providing the services and
infrastructure in-situ, I have looked at sites and services
schemes. Available information indicates that they are a
cost-effective way of providing housing for the urban poor
EPeattie 19823. EExtending the metropolitan area also helps]
absorb the flow of in-migrants to the city.
In themselves, the two concepts Enew towns versus sites and
services3 are difficult to compare. Effectively, new towns, at
least historically, tend to be larger in physical scale and
sometimes imply inter-sectorial comprehensive planning within
the national context of a country. Whether or not actual examples
of new towns illustrate this feeling of comprehensiveness, the
point is that they should be considered only within such a macro
context.
On the other hand, sites and services appear to be an
immediate response to a specific and urgent problem. Which is the
least cost approach in providing housing for the urban poor? This
is the central question this paper addresses.
There are many ways one could compare the two, apparently
opposed, strategies, I have chosen to judge them on the following
criterion: efficiency, equity and political viability.
a) efficiency :
New towns, because they require hugh capital outlays for new
infrastructure, are expensive. However, we are interested in
comparing the cost to other alternatives. Therefore, the value of
data on the cost of new town is in its ability to provide us with
information for comparison - in this case, with sites and
services which is not inexpensive either.
To the governments and institutions providing financial
resources, per capita costs to the respective countries for sites
and services, are also relatively high. Costs of either
alternative is dependent on many factors. Choosing one will
depend on the amount of funds available, more urgent priorities,
and the specific urban context of the particular Less Developed
Country (LDC.)
This brings us to the question of how to structure the basis
for this comparison between costs. If this comparison evolves
around the "cost of one alternative [new towns] as opposed to
another Esites and services]" then that question is easily
answered. In most cases new towns are more expensive than sites
and services, and based on this assumption we can thus eliminate
new towns as a possible solution.
But is that the only criteria to judge by? I believe not. New
towns still offer many advantages and therefore should be
examined to what extent the disadvantages of higher costs may be
overcome.
In reviewing the options I looked at studies conducted in
certain Developed Countries E France and the USA.3 comparing
alternative urban development strategies, such as sprawl and high
density interventions to new towns. The usefulness of these
studies will be in their ability to provide us with information
on comparison Ebetween new towns and their alternatives] that
have not been otherwise undertaken on the subject from the LDCs
perspective.
One might argue that the context is not relevant to the
LDC's. True, but there are certain conditions that will remain
constant. For example, the cost of urban land is still more
expensive than land on the peripheries, or elsewhere, both in
LDCs and DCs.
Also, some of the conditions that led to new towns in DCs ,
in the first place, are now prevalent in LDCs, for example,
congested "primate cities", insufficient urban infrastructures
and services, and a large flow of rural-to-urban migrations.
Important differences are that present compositions and
social structures of LDCs differ considerably. The availability
of massive investment capital, where financial and capital
Markets are often nonexistent, places a greater burden on local
and federal governments. Other pressing needs with far less
opportunity costs are higher on the list of priorities. There
are, of course, other differences, such as the rates of
urbanization ELDCs are urbanizing at a more rapid pace than
DCs), and low prices for commodities like petroleum, sugar, and
bauxite on world markets, affect adversely the once important
flow of foreign exchange. Funds for development have dried up.
This paper will be sensitive to these differences.
b) Eguity_criteria: This is based on the central question of who
really benefits from either choice. Specifically, which option is
better for the poor? New towns are often criticized for being
biased towards the provision of housing and services for the
middle and upper income groups in LDCs, while on the other hand,
sites and services focus essentially on the needs of the poor.
An interesting question would be, why can't new towns address
effectively the needs of the low and middle income groups,
together, in an effective manner? Some may even prefer to ask
the question in reverse, why can't sites and services respond to
the needs of the middle and upper classes? Sometimes this is the
case. There are example of schemes that have ended up in the hand
of the middle-class through the process of "creaming" EPeattie
19823.
c) The political viability criteria This will provide reasons
for choosino one solution over the other, based primarily on the
political viability of the options. The choice is inherently
political. Decision levels in LDCs, for such projects, is
usually Federal and should logically correspond to a general
consensus of the electorate in the respective countries.
In many LDCs this Econsensus of the electorate] is not
reality. After all, how many democratically elected governments
exist in LDCs? The ruling group, although they may be elected
democratically, are mostly of middle class background and
generally represent middle class interests. Projects often
reflect this bias and may supply products and services to this
group instead of to the really needy.
New towns are often cited as providing a higher standard of
living for all potential habitants. However, it must be evaluated
to what extent those who actually benefit from a new town
solution would include the vast majority of the economically
weaker sector.
Available evidence shows contrary results. Peattie points out
that the poor do not despise the good standards of living and
amenities that may exist in new towns but are much more worried
about employment. They are aware that there may not be enough
jobs in new towns that will suit their level of skills.
Structure of the paper.
inas paper comprises of two sections. The first section
concentrates on the new town concept while the second examines
the sites and services alternative. Section 1. introduces the
concept of new towns through a brief historic background and some
discussions of the conditions that led to their implementation in
the developed countries. I also look at why the concept was found
to be relevant for some Lesser Developed Countries.
Section 1 then examines the new towns , within the Developed
Countries context, through the French experience. France was
chosen because of her considerable experience with new towns,
most importantly with the methodology of implementation. In
France a workable financial and administrative system was
developed that did not short-circuit the participation of local
authorities. In fact, the rapport between the local authorities
and the private sector proved workable in the implementation
process.
I then look at the pros and cons for the utilization of the
new town concept in LDC's, examining the absorptive and
employment capacities.
The comparative costs of new towns and other development
alternatives are also evaluated. Analyzing the actual financial
costs of new towns, by themselves, is of little importance to
this study -as stated earlier, instead comparison o-f cost to
other options -for development provide a most useful basis for
evaluation.
SECTION II
Section II examines the concept of sites and services as the
alternative development strategy. First, I attempt to clearly
define of the concept of sites and services, demonstrating its
usefulness, as well as weakness, in providing shelter for the
economically weaker sector in LDCs. Effectively, sites and
services is essentially a shelter-based strategy, and as such
experience difficulties in providing employment for the poor.
This section also looks at the available data on possible
costs of sites and services to governments, financing
institutions, and the targeted low income groups; then tries to
synthesize this information into a meaningful comparison of their
benefits and costs.
The arguments for and against extending the metropolitan
area is examined. Sites and services because of its required in-
situ intervention - ie.within cities - will contribute to this
extension. The advantages and disadvantages as measured by costs
will be looked at. Finally, some conclusions are offered.
The main purpose of this paper though, is to provide
understanding of the basic issues concerning the development of
new towns and other possible alternatives in LDC's. Ideally it
should act as a "stepping stone" in the direction of further in
depth research. I have no pretense to write the final chapters on
a much debated issue.
INTRODUCTION TO THE NEW TOWNS CONCEPT
The modern new town concept was started in England at the
turn of the century. Ebenezer Howard, the founder of the garden
city, proposed that "garden cities" (new towns) be alternatives
to suburban strip development and the congested central city.
Howard's first garden cities were Letchworth (1903) and Welwyn
(1919). Since then, the new town concept has been used by
different countries for different reasons and, of course, in
different contexts.
The new town concept engendered many issues. The fusion of
these issues derived a concept. It is simpler to think that once
upon a time new towns simply provided housing and shelter and
although employment was important it was not necessarily provided
in conjunction with housing and shelter. With evolution the
complexity of our society obliged an integrated approach in the
provision of shelter.
Howard, who wrote "Garden Cities of Tomorrow" , at the time
had very specific visions of what new towns should look like and
tie role they should play, as illustrated below,
"Howard called for the construction of new towns, or garden
cities, on the periphery of existing urban areas. The garden
cities was an isolated, self-contained community planned to be a
predetermined size. It represented a "marriage" between town and
country, where residents enjoy both the employment and shopping
opportunities of the city and the healthy environment of the
countryside. Surrounding the town would be a green belt of
permanent open space to prevent sprawl and to preserve the
physical independence of the garden city. The population would be
recruited from overcrowded existing cities, to enable their
redevelopment at lower densities. Once the planned size of 32,000
was reached, the garden city would no longer grow; further
regional growth would be concentrated in additional new towns.
Eventually, a system of new towns would be developed , each
physically separated by a green belt but linked by a
transportation system." (1)
Before the British new towns there were hardly any notable
precedents. As to what circumstances or conditions led to the
conception and birth of the new town concept? The passage below
suggests that:
"Howard's book, written in 1898 literally as well as
symbolically marked the culmination of nineteenth century concern
for the implication of rapid urbanization. Nineteenth century
cities were characterized by poor physical and social conditions.
Residents in the rapidly growing cities suffered from diseases
and a high mortality rate. Health problems were aggravated by
poverty, wages were low and unemployment high. Housing was
overcrowded and without running water or adequate ventilation.
Crime and social orders increased. The factories produced smoke
and other pollutants." (2)
In examining the new town concept in the Developed
Countries, one does not really see a drastic difference between
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the contex-ts that exiSted Ethen3 in these countries when compared
to prevailing conditions in the Lesser Developed Countries today.
The situation that existed was indeed similar to the LDC's.
Nigeria demonstrates this:
" currently experiencing an urban explosion as a result of
an increased rate of rural-to-urban migration precipitated by
rapid commercial and manufacturing growth concentrated in a few
urban centres. Between 1931 and 1953 the rate of urban growth
stood at about 5 percent per annum; from 1953 to 1963 the rate
more than doubled and rose to 11.9 percent per annum; since the
last accepted census of 1963, various estimates have put the
annual rate o-f urban growth at between 15 and 20 percent. This
high rate of growth means that most of the cities have grown
remarkably, doubling, tripling and even quadrupling their
population over the last two decades. Lagos, for example, doubled
its population from about 700,000 in 1963, to an estimated 1.5
million in 1980." (3)
In dealing with these urban problems, the new town concept
offered new ways of thinking about human existence and living.
One must remember that the context was nineteenth century Europe
[with specific reference to England]. The objectives at the time
were to:
1 - ameliorate living conditions in existing cities by
installing basic infrastructure (water and sewer systems), slum
clearance, highway construction, etc.;
build suburbs that permitted workers to escape from
urban conditions every evening; and to construct entirely new
towns without the poor conditions of the existing cities.(4)
Another reason for the new town concept was the concern for
equitable regional development. They (new towns] were the new
vehicles which would play important roles in the development of
national urban growth policies in Britain and subsequently
France. Planners at the time tried to identify means of dealing
with regional disparity, where poorer regions suffered from
relatively depressed economies characterized by high unemployment
and declining industries.
New towns are also used directly to stimulate regional
development. If "basic" or propulsive industries could not be
easily attracted, employment opportunities could be provided in
the region by the construction of a new town. They logically
became the focus of investment in depressed regions where
existing urban areas were unattractive.
Political decisions, urban problems, industrial growth, and
economic development led to the concept of new towns. Some new
towns were founded on a political idea - the implantation of
central government. For example, the new towns of Islamabad and
Brasilia serve as the seat of their governments.
The case of Ghana illustrates the context that prevailed,
forcing LDCs to find ways of solving their large-scale urban
housing problems. Rates of urbanization grew rapidly over the
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last three decades:
"In 1948, the degree of urbanization (ie. the ratio of urban
population to the total population) was 13 percent. By 1960, this
had risen to 23 percent and in 1970 it was 29 percent. Allied to
this was the increase in the number of urban localities from 39
in 1948 to 135 in 1970. In 1960 almost half of the country's
urban population lived in the seven largest agglomerations with
40 percent in the three largest cities." (5)
The situation did not improve and the rate of urbanization
continued to increase at neckbreaking speed.
"Much of the growth was due to migration. This borne out of
the fact that between 1960 and 1970 the annual national growth
rate was 2.4 percent whereas the growth rates for almost all the
urban centres was 3 percent or more." (6)
This gives an idea of the prevailing conditions that lead
directly to the considerations and utilization of the new town
concept. It is interesting to observe that the above conditions
are identical to the ones existing presently in Urban Areas of
Lesser Developed Countries. It seems that there is a lesson to be
learned from this observation.
Perhaps the conditions [of Urban Areas in LDC's3 reflect a
stage of development that LDC's are only now experiencing and
perhaps the prevailing conditions are a necessary stage of
development.
So, new towns were mostly implemented in Developing Countries
to decentralize economic and population growth by absorbing
population through the provision of housing and employment, or
sometimes providing new capitals for the focal point of economic
development. Brasilia [seen both as an opportunity and a
disaster3, Ciudad Guyana, Chandigarh. Dodoma, are examples of new
towns built in the LDCs context. Each was built for different
reasons, under totally different social, political, and economic
situations.
The new town of Abuja in Nigeria was mostly a new capital but
no one will deny that it was also built for the following
reasons, to:
"relieve the population pressure on Lagos, which through the
massive influx of people [mostly poor, rural-urban in migrators]
had suffered from scarcity of housing, unemployment, traffic
problems, congestion of schools, hospitals, social facilities and
at the same time created pressure on the supply of energy --
general utilities -- and other municipal services." (7)
Due to the acute shortage of housing in the nearby major
city, Lagos, many of the new towns were conceived with an
emphasis on housing in mind, claims Okpala. The result is that
they are usually built up with residential units without
"adequate thought for the provision of supporting infrastructure
and social services." (8)
An unforseen problem accompanied the construction of new
towns. In general, when they were employed in developing
countries, adequate provisions were not made for new municipal
services, institutions, employment and recreational activities.
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This resulted in the dependance o-f new towns -- despite their
relative physical separation -- on the already existing
metropolitan areas for these services and economic facilities,
over taxing already strained infrastructure and service
facilities. The major consequence is that high costs for
maintenance of the existing facilities are incurred. In LDCs
this extra cost is not shared by every one.
So new towns had disadvantages that in return created new
sets of problems for LDCs but they were successful on other
fronts as the French and British experience proved. The example
of the French new towns experience will be closely examined.
THE FRENCH NEW TOWN EXPERIENCE
To look at how successful the new town effort has been for
Developed Countries and examine to what extent lessons might be
learned and applied to the LDC's context, we will examine the
French new town experience, as it is generally cited as a success
ERubensteinl978, Underhill, Brace, Rubenstein 19803. Perhaps one
of its major achievements was social integration - the creation
of socially balanced communities:
"Theirs is a much greater mixture of different housing types
and a balance between residential and non-residential
functions.The new towns in contrast to other suburban areas, are
becoming strong commercial and employment centers.They have much
more jobs opportunities,stores and recreational facilities ....
As heterogenous, self contained communities the new towns have
already made a distinctive contribution to France."(9)
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The French are relative new comers to the modern new town
concept: the first government document in support of them
appeared in 1965. Large scale construction started around 1970.
But the scale of the French new town effort made up largely for
its lateness.
Their program is now one of the most important and ambitious
in the world in terms of housing starts and new employment. Some
available statistics show that by the end of the 1970's French
new towns created somewhere around "'20,000 housing starts and
15,000 new jobs per year. (10)
A total of nine new towns are in advanced stages of
development in France and five alone located within the Paris
region. These "villes nouvelles" are being constructed on a large
scale and at the turn of the present century, the nine new towns
are expected to contain around three million inhabitants. Sizes
of the nine towns range from 140,000 for Le Vaudreuil to 500,000
for Evry and Berre-L'Etang. The sizes of the others will be
somewhere between 250,000 and 300,000.
The French new towns represent a deviation from the original
concept of new town as developed in England. French new towns are
large projects with populations ranging between 140,000 and
500,000 inhabitants, while the British new towns'population was
less ambitious, in terms of population and employment. They were
not to be separated from existing urban areas by "green belts".
They also emphasized the notion of "centralite", or sense of
place, on the development of the down town areas.
The goals of the French new towns, like most new towns, were
"designed to organize large scale urban growth in an orderly
manner, while at the same time achieving a socially balanced
community." The French sixth national plan stipulated very well
what were to be the roles of the new towns. The primary goals
were:
1 - to restructure the suburbs by organizing new
concentrations of employment, housing and services;
2 - to reduce the amount of commuting and ease the transport
problems in particular urban regions;
3 - to create truly self-contained cities, as measured by a
balance between jobs and housing, a variety of different jobs and
housing, the provision of housing and supporting services at the
same time and place the rapid creation of urban centers, and
concern for recreational facilities and environment protection;
4 - they were also to serve as laboratories for experiments
in urban planning and design. (11)
To understand the French rationale behind their new town
policy, one must examine the relationship between the new towns
and other planning policy. At the end of World War Il many
European countries implemented national planning policies and
strategies.The British, for example, commenced the construction
of new towns right after the war, while the French concentrated
their efforts on other more urgent issues. Their preoccupation
with new towns came in the second era of post war planning - in
the 1960's. The two guiding principles of French post war
planning were: the stimulation of national economic growth and
the reduction of regional disparities.
Along with the above reasons and the inability of the city of
Paris to cope with physical growth, in terms of employment and
housing, the French derived and implemented the new town
concept. It was evident at the time that the geographic areas of
urbanization would expand and they wanted control over the
processes in order to direct this imminent growth. They projected
that the Paris region would grow from a population of 8.4 million
in 1962 to 14 million by the year 2000.
The need to expand the Paris region was recognized and two
choices were available between continuous development and
isolated points of growth. The latter was ignored because "it
required a sharper discipline or control than the French people
would accept." according iM. Delouvrier.t The alternative of urban
sprawl was also unacceptable. French planners had in mind
continuous growth controlled along chosen axes or "couloirs".
The French provincial new towns, those not in the Paris
region, were designed to decentralize national growth in an
efficient manner. It is necessary to remark that in general the
majority of french new towns were not for low-income groups, but
eventually some like Scarcelles ended up having high populations
of immigrants who were low-income.
Most urban areas in Developing Countries presently are
experiencing urban growth at an alarming rate with national
growth lopsided and uniquely concentrated in urban areas. The
rural-urban drift factor is largely responsible, creating
overloads on urban infrastructure systems. The consequences are
the multiple problems of accommodation, overcrowding, congestion,
employment and environmental degradation.
Their situation is not unlike the Paris region in France in
the years following the second world war. However, the French
problem has been an historic one that has plagued the country
since the nineteenth century. In most developed countries
Developed at that time, cities were growing faster than rural
1 President of L'EDF,France. "LExperience Francaise Des
Villes Nouvelles."
areas. In France the trend was dramatic. The situation worsened
after 1850 when the pattern of evenly distributed growth was
destroyed by changing technological conditions, for example, the
substitution of electricity for coal. Jobs and population was
increasingly concentrated in the Paris region. The area then grew
at the expense of the rest of the country - precisely the
situation in the Lesser Developed Countries today.
After world war II national attention was focused on the
imbalance in growth between the Paris region and the rest of the
French territory. Nonetheless the region grew from 6.6 million in
1946 to 6.4 million in 1962. In absence of effective planning and
control, the region rapidly expanded during the 1940's and 1950's
in an uncontrolled sprawl - accentuating social problems. The
region became divided into segregated social units.
"Pressure to locate in Paris drove out space intensive
activities in favour of those requiring little space, and
attracts those who are willing to pay for the location. Thus,
offices are expanding in the center while factories moved out,
and the well-to-do stay in the center while the poor are priced
Out. " (12)
In LDC's the major part of investment comes from the national
governments. Usually national governments are the sole providers
of the financial resources needed to guide large scale projects,
especially through the early stages. Perhaps LDC's can learn from
the example of the French financing system, because most LDC's
have strong federal or central governments making collaborative
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efforts cumbersome between private sector and local government.
The French dealt with all these factors effectively. They sat
out to achieve a rational distribution of the financial burden
among the national government, local authorities, and the private
sector. Each member of the development team was expected to make
capital contributions to the venture, the local authority
providing basic social infrastructure such as schools, day care
centers, police security and welfare.
The French new towns were financed by local taxes, federal
national grants, and loans from the national bank (CDC). The
Development Corporation (EPA) conducted essential studies,
purchased property, installed infrastructure and sought to
attract potential developers. These activities were financed
through grants and loans from the state and money from the sale
of land.
The French system was relatively more complex than the
British, who's system - although simpler, excluded the
participation of local governments in the decision process. For
the development of new towns, they used a Development Corporation
which was responsible for nearly all aspects of the development
process. The corporation then borrowed money from the national
treasury. Loans were secured from the national government for
fifty years and were to be paid back with money received from the
21
saIes and renting of land.
The important conclusion to be drawn here is that the French
financing system was sucessful and LDCs can benefit by adopting
it to their proper contexts. As new towns cost are expensive the
financial burden cannot be carried by any one entity, i.e. the
state or federal government, local governments, or the private
sector.
The French experience tells us that it is possible to
encourage the successful participation of the private sector. The
American example tells us the opposite, that the scale of new
towns were much too large for the private sector alone to handle.
The French model is good for LDCs to use as example because it
required the harmonious cooperation of these entities, private
sector, public sector, and local governments to make the
experience a success.
So far, in LDCs there has been virtually no support from the
private sector and all funding has been from national sources.
This may be a potential source of financing for new towns or
sites and services in LDCs, encouraging the replicability of both
strategy. Success may lie in the ability of governments in LDCS
to encourage the participation of the private sectors.
ARGUMENTS FOR NEW TOWNS IN LDCs.
In the LDCs where rapid urban growth is prevaient,large-scale
and overall planning is necessary. This large scale increase in
demand for services and infrastructure logically cannot be
answered by just marginal increase in amenities and
infrastructure. They are already overtaxed. Even if there were no
problems with in-migration, additional infrastructure is still
necessary to service the existing population. James Rubenstein
thinks that;
"These services and facilities, which will be needed in any
event, can be more economically provided by New Towns: 1 - Land
is acquired at lower price - outside the city; 2 - The building
of infrastructure in new towns is cheaper than adiing the same
level of services to already built-up areas;... " (13)
The urgent arguments for new towns in LDCs can be reduced
essentially to four:
1 - The Absorptive Capacity ,2 - Provision of Employment, 3 -
Hiigh Cost of Urban Land, and 4 - As a Political Symbol.
1 - The Absorptive Capacity.
The defendants of new towns argue that inmigrants must be
absorbed somewhere, because already existing metropolitan areas
in many Developing Countries cannot deal effectively with the new
influx. New towns may solve this problem, providing housing,
social and physical infrastructure in an absorptive capacity.
However, scholars argue that this absorptive capacity is
seriously hampered by an inability of organized efforts to solve
the problem from the source. in addition, no large scale
urbanization solutions can effectively address continuous growth
in the metropolitan areas. In this capacity, new towns would not
be final solutions, as there is no possible way they would keep
up with the population growth -- even if many new towns were
built.
Perhaps the contribution of new towns may be of an
example-setting nature inciting private development initiatives
to replicate them. However, this seems highly unlikely, under
present situations, as up-front capital needed is considerable
and the nature of investment is long term. The French example is
of special interest to us as it succeeded in working with the
private sector, public sector, and local governments.
2 - Providing Employment:
The issue of employment becomes crucial if we need to absorb
this inflow of human resource in a productive manner. It is found
that migrants go to the cities essentially for a better life, and
his or her only hope is through employment. Attracting industries
and business to new towns is not easy. Packaged deals and well
studied incentives must be used as "'carrots." This act is
very costly to the state and local governments.
- The most compelling argument for creating new towns --
usuaIly away +rom the existing cities in LDC's - seems to be the
cost of metropolitan land. Land in many cities commands high
prices in free or mixed market economies. Governments are
sometimes large owners of land in cities and may assembly it
owing to their powers of eminent domain, for major developments.
The governments are also aware that they will not always get
market price for developable urban land. The land which is
usually squatted upon in LDC's. by the urban poor, is mostly
prime or has the potential of being very expensive. Urban land is
usually under supplied, thus commanding high prices. However, the
majority of urban squatters refuse to be displaced. The
qovernments sometimes have no other alternative but to provide
low income housing on valuable land, making little financial
sense but far greater social impact.
Governments then have the alternative of looking outside
metropolitan areas for the development of new towns or sites and
services where the cost of land is relatively cheaper. Logically
if land is cheaper, then housing units provided would also be
cheaper - if other factors remain constant. Thus cost recovery
can be positively impacted. If there were to be a failure in the
recovery of investment costs, and this is usually what happens,
governments would not have lost or tied up the use of valuable
urban land.
However, most low income dwellers and squatters in urban
areas are unprepared to be displaced - for valid reasons. The
poor know that the Jobs generally available in new towns do not
suit them. There the government is sometimes left to intervene
within the cities, affecting project cost and losing more
profitable alternative developments.
4 - As a Symbol of the "incarnation" of national pride and
economic strength :
Another pretext used for new towns in the past by developing
countries was as a symbol of the incarnation of national pride
and economic strength, illustrating their rise from the ranks of
poor nations to elevated position of economically
better-off countries. Brasilia may be one such example. However,
due to current economic crisis and high foreign debts incurred,
most Developing Countries cannot afford the opportunity costs to
other sectors of such capital intensive projects.
Others ,Egypt for example, could not achieve its proposed
broad goals through isolated interventions of sites and services
programs, and looked towards a more broader solution. Taking the
example of Sadat City (a New Town-Industrial Center), it was hard
to see where any other solution save for a new town could pretend
to accomplish what they wanted to achieve.
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"Sadat City is to be a new industrial city located midway
between Cairo and Aiexandria on the desert road. The city is
expected to have a population of at least 500,000 by the year
2000; to provide at least 165,000 jobs by that year; and is
planned to physically expand to accommodate up to 1,5 million
persons within 50 years." (14)
It was also to be:
"part of a national development strategy to save agricultural
land,... to further the nation's economic growth, and to provide
jobs and housing away from the overcrowded cities of Cairo and
Alexandria." (15)
The above declaration implied that any physical development
physical had to be approached from an integrative point of view,
ie. physical development must be combined with economical
development. There was nothing fundamentally wrong with this
approach, except that the Egyptians could not afford the required
expenditures and investments. However, president Sadat and the
government believed that something needed to be done, as
demonstrated below,
"The issues behind the development strategy are clear and
compelling: limited agricultural land and a dramatic increase in
population. Egyptian settlement is confined to less than 4
percent of the nation's area which consists of the rich
agricultural land of the Nile river and its delta. Rapid
population growth has resulted in about 8 million new residents
over the past decade, bringing the population of Egypt to an
estimated 38 million in mid 1976.Population density in the
inhabited area is one of the highest in the world at about 1,230
people per square kilometer. This is expected to increase sharply
if year 2000 population projection of 60 to 75 million occur."
(16)
It became obvious that Egypt did not require a short-term
solution but rather a global one that would attempt to take it
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out o4 the ranks of dependent third world countries. Fresident
Anwar Sadat himself said,
"... I believe... it is time for drawing up a new map for
Egypt. This cannot be achieved by setting up scattered projects
here and there. It can be done by creating areas for population
concentration and new economic activities... able to equal the
pulling power of the capital." (17)
The concept of new towns was thus appropriate for these
objectives.
In the utilization of the new town concept in Third World
countries, it is essential to understand, what will be provided
in terms of housing, who will provide it, and what are the
trade-offs.
One disadvantage of the new town concept in LDCs] is that
new towns tend to service uniquely the housing and employment
needs of the middle and upper income groups, leaving the
economically weaker sector excluded. Efforts are not made to
attract more low-income residents by providing the maze of
economic activities that result in the creation of the inter-
dependencies responsible for the informal sector.
Another disadvantage is that manufacturing industries and
services do not necessarily relocate on the requests of
governments. The process requires compensating subsidies of very
high costs that contribute, in the end, to the expensiveness of
new towns.
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However, let us assume that we could some how get industries
to relocate in new towns. The level of relocation would have to
be very high to produce the necessary economic conditions
conducive for their [low income groups3 existence. Perhaps new
towns could be conceived in phases that would allow the poor to
he integrated continuously and at later stages, when the
necessary conditions for employment and shelter would have been
created. However, this process is a long term one. And the poor
need housing and employment immediately.
In the development of residential units by the private
sector, efforts to attract the low income group is given less
importance, because the flow of profit will be assured if
developers target high income groups. This contributes to the
back-logs in low income housing supply. If low income housing is
to be provided successfully in LDC's, they must be targeted with
the help of the government.
Another argument frequently used against new towns is that
their "per capita infrastructure costs are excessively high"
[Wheaton and Shishido3. They suggest that in fact, the unit price
or cost of a given level of infrastructure is roughly equivalent
in both new towns and the current urban fringe. However, the
level of infrastructure normally proposed for most new towns is
higher than current and planned infrastructure around existing
urban areas. They [Wheaton and Shishido3 think there is no
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technological reason why new towns should be so expensive and
they thus argue that "high standards may be a necessary form of
subsidy which reflects a different kind of cost."
Levels of utilities, quality of housing, transportation,
infrastructure and some social services in new towns sometimes
exceed the existing quality in some cities. This may be due to a
conscious effort on the part of the government to attract new
settlers or labour by luring them.
Wheaton and Shishido think it is "reasonable to suggest that
-over planning is really a form of implicit subsidization." An
example is the case of Egypt, where the cost of housing and
utility provided -- in one of its new towns -- is only slightly
greater while "the costs of transportation, education, culture
and health is ... greater." (I) This illustrates the point that
an emphasis on amenities as an escalating cost factor must be
taken into account.
The standards [level of infrastructure) and costs for
investment in infrastructure, services and housing in some new
town design are such that they impose a very heavy strain on the
economy and cause many other required infrastructure investments
to be forgone. For example, the estimated cost for the completion
of Sadat City, 10th of May City, and 6th of October City [in
Egypt] represented about 16* of the total infrastructure
investment allocaEted for the entire Cairo reQion over a period o+
20 years. This heavy investment would benefit only 4.9% of the
projected population of the region by the year 2000.
This cost -- requiring compensating subsidy -- of locating
employment in new towns as opposed to existing metropolitan areas
is high, but industries have to be attracted for employment. This
often requires heavy government subsidizations - contributing to
make costs prohibitive.
The question of "over-standards" in new towns -for developing
countries is of major concern. By "over-standards" we really mean
an exaggerated high level of design for infrastructure not
crucial to the proper functioning of a project. Excessive
standards occur in LDC's for different reasons. One reason is
that many engineers and architects of developing countries are
often times trained abroad in developed countries, and as a
consequence, import engineering standards of these countries,
sometimes unconsciously, that are too costly and inappropriate
for LDCs.
Another reason is that engineers tend to design most projects
as if they will never be maintained. Sometimes poor coordination
between local agencies are also responsible for the premature
uses of infrastructure. For example, roads paved without thought
for telephone and water supply mains or telephone lines layed
after water supply when both tasks could have been carrieo out
simultaneously. This results in added cost for removal and
replacement.
However, Carlos Brando thinks this is more of an
institutional problem, and looking at the example of Egypt,
believes that it will be a long process trying to convince LDCs
to re-evaluate these standards. Brando also notes that the World
Bank, who finances many such projects, is now opting for
solutions with appropriate technology indicating that the problem
may lie within the developing countries themselves. The World
Bank thinks the alternative may be to invest money into less
expensive systems, structures, or projects meanwhile emphasizing
servicing and serviceable projects. (19)
Gakenheimer thinks that there are not many options for LDCs.
He points out that, the average life span of a highway Ein the
United States] is about twenty-five years. It would cost a lot
more to rebuild the system than it did to build it the first
time. The argument excuses expensive first time up-front capital
expenditure for infrastructure. These excessive standards are
responsible for high costs that could have been avoided, or
invested elsewhere, but it can be argued that these costs are
needed to lure potential inhabitants to new towns. (20)
32
However, this investment strain can be reduced by increased
density and land use efficiency. But even if significant
reduction in standards for infrastructure. housing, as well as
improved cost recovery through the sale of land, new towns may
still be more expensive than incremental development, such as
sites and services schemes, close to built-up areas where use can
be made of existing infrastructures.
Also, in general the scope of new towns in LDCs are so large
that they tax managerial and organizational skills, both for the
construction and development control required. The compexity of
new town planning makes it necessary to have readily available
technical and managerial savoir-faire in addition to a highly
skilled construction work force - prefererably local - on a large
scale. LDCs typically lack these skills and dont always have them
in the quantity needed. Training and importing the necessary
skills will contribute to costs.
The concept of new towns may still be implemented in LDCs
however the concept will need revision. Given the important funds
needed to implement them considerable care must taken to ensure
that they are implemented within the framework of comprehensive
and inter-sectorial planning. They must also assure the supply of
affordable low-income housing for the urban poor which may be
done by incorporating the concept of sites and services within
that of new towns.
Where possible new towns should De constructed on the
outskirts, or -far away from the metropolitan area, to take
advantage of the inexpensiveness of land. They must be
constructed on relatively cheap land to counterbalance possible
high new fixed expenditures for infrastructure, without which new
towns loose their competitiveness and will be more expensive
than alternative developments. Intervention must also be high
density in nature where possible.
The myriad problems that will accompany such a choice must be
faced. One such problem is the attraction of industries and
services to new towns for the provision of jobs for potential
inhabitants, especially the type low-income people need.
Governments will still have to contribute by offering
compensating subsidies and extended periods of tax advantages. By
declaring them special economic zones perhaps they will be able
to compete with the already established metropolitan areas.
Finally, the problem of rural-urban migration in LDCs will
not be easily solved and will remain an important factor
contributing to urban overpopulation. Unless the predominant
motives for migration are looked at and addressed, [and they are
still economic ones], getting a job in the capital city will
remain the only hope for survival and escape from the vicious
circle of rural underdevelopment. Until these urgent problems are
addressed the flow will continue to urban areas with their
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related problems.
THE COMPARATIVE COSTS OF NEW TOWNS AND ALTERNATIVE APPROACHES IN
RESPONDING TO THE HOUSING NEEDS OF LDCs.
The issue here is whether new towns are cheaper or more
expensive than other forms or urban development in the provision
of housing.
All new town ventures require "up-front" costs to be paid way
in advance, long before the question of revenue and returns on
equity are considered. Capital is needed for the acquisition of
land, lay-out of infrastructures, and the development of
buildings.
It is only after development is complete that they are sold,
rented or leased, hopefully at prices that enable investors and
developer to recuperate cost and make a profit. The fact that new
towns are very large scale operations make this "up-front"
expense factor very important.
However, new towns may be cheaper than other forms of urban
development under special circumstances. Studies showed that
because of their prominence, they [new towns] are judged unfairly
as more expensive. Also, because they include all costs of urban
development, at first appearance it is high, but they have no
hidden coSt as do usual projects. (21
To compare the costs of development of new towns with more
traditional development projects, we must compare the cost per
dwelling of land acquisition and amenities for new towns and
alternative development projects in the inner and outer suburbs
of the metropolitan areas in question. In the case of Paris it
was found that, land for new towns were comparatively less
expensive - 2,200 Francs per dwelling, compared to 13,.500 in the
inner suburbs and 4,800 in the outer.
The cost of direct utility connection to residents was also
estimated at 4,800 Francs for the inner suburbs and 6,600 for the
outer. The figures were then compared to estimates for supplying
secondary and tertiary [amenities, light, gas, water, etc3
infrastructure to new towns. The cost was 10,000 Francs for both
secondary and tertiary utilities. The rational, Rubenstein
explained,
"for comparing the cost of secondary and tertiary equipment
in the new towns with just tertiary elsewhere is that in the
traditional suburbs new projects often hook into existing water
and sewer systems. On this basis, land and equipment cost 11,400
francs per dwelling in the outer suburbs, 12,200 in the new
towns, and 18,100 in the inner suburbs. Even with the higher
utility costs the new towns are still competitive with projects
in the outer suburbs and they are cheaper than the inner
suburbs." (22)
The same studies indicated that the cost of urban land is so
high that savings on land acquisition in the new towns more than
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offset the additional infrastructure expenses. For this samie
reason it should be more advantageous for Developing Countries to
locate new towns outside metropolitan areas. In general the poor
and squatters are reluctant to pull Lp roots and leave the city.
As seen, the high cost of new towns can be compensated for,
if land on the outskirts of the metropolitan area, which is
cheaper, is utilized. However, if the people are unwilling to be
displaced, then that advantage will be lost. In LDC's although
most governments have the power of eminent domain, they know it's
a double-edged sword that can be used against them. They usually
give in, reluctantly, making concession of valuable urban land
for which they generally do not recuperate the cost.
Le Groupe Central des Villes Nouvelles Ethe body in charge of
Developing new towns in France] conducted a study and found that
when the total costs of new infrastructure per new inhabitant in
their new towns of Evry and Cergy-Pontoise was compared with the
existing cities of Orleans, Rennes, and Tours, the cost was
1,63 Francs per new inhabitant for the existing cities and only
975 Francs in the new towns.
Other studies [Golany 1976, Rubenstein 19783 in the United
States compared the cost of development for a number of typical
projects on the outskirts of urban areas. The projects were used
to compare organized development as opposed to sprawl and high
resi dent ial denity ver sus ow density. Hi gh density urban
inrtervention, proved cost-effective with economic advantages
coming from reduced costs fror infrastructure networks and
transportation systems ERubenstein 19783. Inversely, excessive
low densities will be responsible for increasing transportation
and infrastructure costs -- both to citizens and governments.
The question of whether or not it is better to intervene
inside or outside cities is important, as providing
infrastructure and services on the outskirts of existing
metropolitan areas! if they are relatively dense, will be less
expensive. Important capital expenditures spent on construction
and maintenance of infrastructure, for too few people, will
result in overall low per capita costs.
A comparative study ERecht and Harman 3to illustrate the
above point, of a wide range of economic, environmental and
social effects of three density type -- low density sprawl, a
combination mix Eof low and high density], and a high density mix
-- discovered that a high density planned community costs 21 per
cent less "in terms of total public and private investments to
occupants, tax payers, and local governments than the combination
mix of the second possibility, and 44 per cent less than the low
density sprawl." The studies supported the argument that the
adverse effects of uncontrolled growth Esprawl3 can be minimized
by increased densities and better planning in cities. It is also
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demonstrated in this study that high density community
significantly reduces the consumption of energyt
The above context is obviously in the Developed Countries but
it -fits well the Developing countries context. Usefulness may lie
in the ability of these studies, in the DCs context, to provide
us with information and conclusions already made on comparison
between new towns and other forms of development.
James Rubenstein states that, "there is no difference between
building superstructure in a new town or anywhere else." and the
cost of construction materials is essentially the same. However,
new fixed costs for infrastructure, such as sewerage treatment
plants in new towns, raises the cost after supplying these
services.
Another obvious problem with applying this assumption to
LDCs, is that cost for transporting material to areas outside
cities is higher. But this can be off-set by the cheap cost of
labour in LDCs. However, the most important similarities are the
cost of land [urban land is expensive both for LDCs and DCsJ, and
the high new fixed costs for infrastructure, which effectively
use up a large percentage of development budget. Understandable
the social, economic, and political conditions are not the same.
Also alternative development strategies [sites and services,
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upgraong] are relatively new social concepts for LDCs ano
available published data on total costs, for a significant amount
of sites and services schemes, are not readily available.
Another important difference is that the alternative
development strategies in LDCs are, in the majority, executed by
the public sectors while in DCs, private sector involvement is
considerable. The French example testifies to this while the USA
proved that their scope is much too large for the private sector
to undertake alone [Rubenstein.19783.
Local private sector participation, for sites and services
schemes, may be a lesson LDCs could learn well from the developed
countries context examined above. There is considerable burden
placed on the public sector and financial institutions for their
provision, as in the case of new towns. Replicability may be
affected positively if the private sector is allowed to
participate within a framework of clear rules.
To look at some actual numbers for costs, two projects for
sites and services schemes done by the World Bank, in two
different countries, are looked at. The countries are Zambia and
Jordan. The Zambia projects date back to 1974, while the Jordan
projects are more recent, 1985. They were chosen mainly because
the information on them was readily available.2
2 World Bank Reports.
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The Zambia:Lusaka Squatter Upgradinig and Si te and Services
project consisted of:
(a; "servicinq 17,000 dwellings in four major squatter
settlements; preparation of 7,600 residential plots in three
overspill areas located adjacent to upgraded settlements and
serviced to the same level as the settlements themselves;
preparation and servicing of 4,400 residential plots in six sites
designated for sites and services under the Lusaka Master Plan.
(b) building materials loans for house improvement/constructions;
(c) primary infrastructure (water, sewerage, roads) essential to
the project;
(d) communities facilities including schools, health clinics,
multi-purpose community centers, marketsand demonstration
houses;
ie) technical assistanceincluding project unit
operations.construction supervision, training of community
development workers, studies and further project preparation."
(2-3)
The total estimated project costs was 26.2 Zambian kwacha or
US$41.2. A break-down of total costs shows site preparation and
servicing was estimated at US$8.2 million (or 20" of TPC); cost
of necessary building materials (including materials loans and
equipment) at US$9.0 million (22%); primary infrastructure was
US$4.7 million and community facilities [secondary and tertiary
infrastructure] US$4 million, making total costs for
infrastructure US$8.7 million (21.2%). Technical assistance was
US$5.6 million (13.71%);land was only US$187,000 (.5%); and
physical and price contingencies US$9.3 million (22.7%).
To deal with fluctuation in prices Eexcluding land, building
materials, and technical assistance3 contingency costs were
estinmated the highest (22.7%), followed by build ing materials
(22.X), infrastructure (21.2%), site preparation and servicing
(19.9%), and technical assistance (13.7%)
The total costs for upgrading slums and four sites and services
schemes in Jordan [Ruseifa 2A, Ruseifa 2b, Naquab, and Um Nowaral
is estimated at 35.4 million Jordan Dinar(JD) or US$88.5 million.
This cost reflect provision for all contingencies.
The financial plan for obtaining the 88.5 million dollars
shows the World Bank providing US$28 million, in the form of
loans;the local Housing Bank (HB) US$22.3 million (25%); the
Jordanian Government US$20 million (213%); beneficiaries
themselves US$17 million (197); and the Low Income Revolving Fund
(LIHRF) US$1.2 million (1%).
Of the five sources only one [the World Bank] is external,
showing that local financial mechanisms are bearing most of the
costs, US$60.5 million (68%). Furthermore, the funds from the
World Bank are not grants and must be repaid. In actual fact,
Jordan is financing the entire project, indirectly.
However, to get meaningful pictures of what the figures mean,
one should calculate the total project costs for the entire
scheme, as percentage of the country's gross national or domestic
product, then examine them with the same numbers for investments
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in dif-ferent economic sectors of the country in question.
While GNP or GDP figures are not available for respective
years for both countries, there is reasonable evidence CWorld
Bank,19853 to suggest that this cost is relatively high. In the
case of Jordan, for the period between 1976-1980, substantial
local resources have been mobilized for housing which represented
6% of GNP. The current five year plan [1981-19653 allocation was
US$825 million or "O.8%6 of total public sector investment for
public housing."
Also, for an idea of cost to government, and beneficiaries,
one might derive per capita costs (total costs divided by number
of beneficiaries) then compare this cost to their disposable
income. In Amman the entire scheme was to benefit a total of
28.200 people at a cost of US$88.5 million. Per capita costs for
beneficiaries would be US$3,120 or 1,248 JD which is quite
expensive considering that up to 26% of households in the Amman
urban region have incomes below the World Bank-defined urban
poverty threshold of JD140 per month. [World Bank,19853 It is
only after a period of 8 to 12 years that per capita costs is
reduced to US$1,767 or JD706 when the total number of
beneficiaries will be around 50,000.
Costs to major lending institutions are important. They have
attached considerable value to the concept of sites and services
in its ability to house the urban low-income. The World L3ank. for
example has underscored the importance of sites and services
approaches by adopting it as their official loan and technical
assistance for countries seeking help in low-income
housing,EWorld Bank,19753. This importance was measured by the
total cost commitment of the World Bank in fifteen different
countries in 1975.
"In 1972,the World Bank formally adopted sites and services
as its official loan and technical assistance outlet for new low-
income housing and squatter upgrading. In 1974 USAID began to
incorporate sites and services programs into its mortgage
guaranty program for developing countries. Since 1972, the bank
has assisted in about 149,000 new home sites, and upgraded
742, 000 squatter plots in 17 countriesqwith loans exceeding 1,029
million dollars."(24)
THE CONCEPT OF SITES AND SERVICES.
In trying to understand how sites and services may
contribute, one must understand the prevailing conditions that
made the concept imperative and immediate.
Over-population in third world cities due mainly to the
phenomenon of in-migration taxed the supply of affordable
housing, which was already scarce, laid the foundation for many
squatter settlements. The prominent place held by in-migration in
LDCs' urbanization process meant that household formation has
been rapid, ahead of the provision of urban facilities like
housing, the result has been the build up of slums and a constant
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I.ortage of adequate housing with no absorptive capacity. With
these rates of urbanization, most cities were, and still are
incapable of meeting minimum requirements for the newly arrived
inhabitants of the cities. inevitably slums are the outcome.
These factors were the major forces that lead LDC's to
rethink the solutions they hoped would impact positively the
unprecedented urban growth.
For the economically weaker sector, affordability and
financing is a major concern, as sometimes even the smallest
contribution toward ownership cannot be met. Most cannot afford
the cheapest government subsidized housing, and in light of
these prevailing economic conditions, sites and services
projects, along with urban upgrading schemes, were considered
feasible alternatives, both for governments and international Aid
Agencies alike. The World Bank applauded the concept because it
attempted to house a large sector of the population in acceptable
accommodations at relatively lower costs.
Peattie puts it this way, "if the current studies of such
population show anything, it is that individual families have
very different strategies for economic survival; ... land and
housing is generally the largest single element in such
strategies..." (25)
45
The concept of sites and services loOks at a viable means of
housing the urban low income in LDCs. Conventional subsidized
low income housing have failed for inability to pay even minimum
contributions. There is a high percentage of low income (mostly
rural-urban migrants) dwellers in the cities which implies global
and large scale operations to provide shelter. To acknowledge the
scale of such a provision of housing stock, at relatively low
costs, sites and services are relevant.
The central concept of [sites and services projects] is a
shift of focus from providing houses to providing serviced lots.
The attempt is to develop a policy instrument capable of meeting
the needs of families at the lower end of the income spectrum,
and to harness the energies of the occupants themselves in
producing a low income housing stock. (26)
The concept of sites and services can offer many advantages.
After reviewing literature on the subject, E World Bank,1974;
Van Huyck,1971; Peattie,1981 and Grimes,19763, some of the main
advantages are outlined below.
Sites and services may provide dwelling environments at
minimal financial costs. This can be achieved by making it
possible for potential inhabitants to help themselves in the
actual construction by providing equity in the form of energy -
otherwise known as "sweat equity." This allows for savings on
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cos-s tIat would not have been otherwise possible.
Costs are further minimized by attaining economies of scale
through the large scale laying of infrastructure not possible
with more expensive conventional housing projects. Consequently
sites and services are less expensive therefore more affordable
by the economically weaker sector. This lower unit cost ensures a
more equitable distribution of government funds, ensuring
horizontal and vertical equity. By horizontal and vertical equity
we mean providing more benefits among the most low-income and
lessening the differences between the rich and the poor.
It is believed that by spreading smaller investment costs
per unit over many more households, sites and services can lower
investment risks [Beardmore,19783 making them more viable
economic instruments. Investors thus see "cost-recoverability"
with a different eye - as more realistic. In return cost recovery
and inexpensiveness makes replicability possible.
"if schemes are designed to be within the occupants' capacity
to pay,there will be little or no element of net subsidy and
hence projects will self-liquidating. Replicability is a
necessary criterion if the strategy is to have any long term
impact on the problem of providing the low-income with access to
urban services. Replicability facilitates the massive application
of the concept with beneficial effects on the stability of the
low-income rental housing market." (27)
From a social point of view, we can argue that the sites and
services concept can be applicable to all income groups, which
47
may foster social integration through spatial integration. It may
make it easier for different income groups to come together,
create and develop communities of different economic priorities.
The approach is adaptable. Programs may be designed with
different types and availability of services at varying
intervals. As peoples" needs change constantly they can be
accommodated for when income is available. This is an important
factor as income is mainly intermittent among the low-income.
Loans for construction and materials will also benefit local
markets through new sources of capital. A "multiplier effect" can
thus be created within the community by the availability of this
credit affecting positively various local sectors.
From an administrative point of view implementation is
simpler. When investment decisions concerning housing is placed
in the hands of the people concerned the process is facile and
removes some of the burden from local governments. It also has
the added advantage of giving potential dwellers more control
over their destiny.
Sites and services also have drawbacks. Some scholars3 claim
that the selective process for participating in schemes base on
income and the ability to pay for shelter, produces some adverse
effects. "Creaming" by further stratifying society along the
3 see page 46.
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lines o-f income will produce more disadvantages then benefits.
Futhermore, by separating the financially better-offs from the
extremely poor creates negative ripple effects, destroying
economic "symbiotic" relationships that existed beforehand.
Peattie suggested that there are very closely knitted
relationships that exist, a sort of economic "eco-system" between
people in squatter settlements. The network if disturbed could
lead to economical alienation of the weaker sector among this
group. The relationship is economically symbiotic and vital. In
suggestions on short-run implications for relocation, a paper on
sites and services mentions,
"it appears to be of great importance that sites and services
projects are designed so that they do the absolute minimum damage
to economic relations that bind those most likely to be
interested in a sites and services program to the income groups
just below them, and dependent upon them for livelihood." (28)
Those left behind may be prone to social and economic stagnation.
Sites and services are accused of contributing to the
spatial contribution of wealth within and between regions. Inter-
regional disparities will emanate from the inability of
government to control and direct schemes in the hands of the
targeted population and not of other regions. This results in the
out flow of investment capital from one region to another -
especially from rural to urban.
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"in addition sites and services are charged with relegating
the poor to the periphery o-f the cities where large parcels of
land are cheaper and more easily available than in the cities."
(29)
There are also examples of projects that have ended up in the
hands of the middle class, and not those they were intended for.
The middle class some times ends up controlling certain project
specific factors of productions like land and capital along with
supplies of construction materials and technical assistance-Other
times sites and services schemes end up being too expensive for
the targeted population indicating that some form of government
subsidy is necessary.
They are sometimes criticized for being too large in scale,
and low in density. Their inability to come up to acceptable
aesthetic levels of traditional subsidize low-income houses has
made come under attack for being "planned slums." And after all
which government wants to be accused of creating
slums. EPeattie, 19803
Other attacks leveled against them are, the expensiveness of
project administration and scarceness of technical assistance.
The latter is very important and can affect replicability. The
inability to form administrative and technical personnel will
affect large-scale implementation of sites and services.
Inadequate mechanisms for addressing cost-recovery has resulted
in large-scale defaults of monthly payments contributing to
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finAncial failures of many scnemes.
Their choice seems to be dictated by urgency, cost, and
economic conditions while new towns seem to be of global
dimensions. Sites and services is a solution born out of
financial necessity and the inability of planners to solve the
difficult and sensitive issues of clearing slums in the cities.
Many scholars think that the sites and services alternative
is the only feasible solution to an immediate problem. They have
been proven cost-effective and replicable, but at the same time,
they are seriously hampered by problems of cost-recovery. Perhaps
issues here should not be one of comparison, but one of
appropriate choice -- the sites and services concept (because of
its cost-effectiveness) seeming more feasible at present. This
choice, of course, will depend on the country in question, its
economic and financial capacity, and the overall context.
Finally sites and services should be considered as vehicles
of progressive change at an early stage of development, and as
such, should be transitional points in upward social mobility,
for the majority of poor urban dwellers. Furthermore we can
perceive it to be a form of progressive development implying that
people should do with what's available until economic conditions
allow more ambitious plans and goals.
ARGUMENTS FOR EXTENDING THE CITY :
These arguments favour sites and services. One imply that
addition or intervention to the already existing metropolitan
area can have some positive consequences. The argument infers
that larqe cities can be beneficial in many ways if particular
attention is paid to the problem of high density intervention
when new development is being considered.
Effectively, large cities are generally felt to have greater
productivity and that is why they usually attract business firms
and industries. This in return will create the necessary
conditions for the jobs low income groups are qualified for. The
many explanations for such phenomenon all seem to converge by
suggesting that "output per unit of input increases with city
size. Therefore factor payments should as well." The fact that
income and wages are generally higher in cities, than in rural
areas, support the above claim. Large cities in LDC's will also
offer agglomeration economies for most types of economic
activity. However, the law of diminishing returns suggest that
their is an optimum economic level above which these advantages
will be lost.
The question of their social costs is not solved and how
serious they Esocial costs] are, is debatable. It is found that
social costs will affect the poor while agglomeration economies
tend to benefit industries. This poses the question of "trade
of-fs" between opportunity cosCs -- in some respects what is bad
for households in Developing Countries may be good for business
firms. If one accepts the "mirror-model" theory of development
for Developing Countries they could be compared to most capitals
in Europe during the industrial revolution where social costs
were completely ignored.
Some economists argue that the presence of poverty,
pollution, inadequate housing and other symptoms [in large cities
of LDC's3 should have no direct impact on the attractiveness of
cities to business. Therefore it is not unnatural for industries
and large firms to want to remain in the large cities. Local and
state Governments are therefore less likely to respond to
complaints about the extent of social costs.
The physical and human capital that is already available in
urban areas is a valuable source for economic growth --
commercial and industrial expansion. Thus letting existing cities
continue to grow can stimulate economic growth by taking
advantage of the economies of scale.
Recent studies EAlonso,W.19723 infer that large metropolitan
centres produce more benefits than costs and that their
development can be beneficial to the national context. There is
debate as to the usefulness of optimum city size but it is
53
suggested that size should occur somewhere between 100,000) and
1,000,00Q, with 25v_00 being the most popular EWinQo L.,19721.
Perhaps LDC's should ignore the notion of optimum city size.
Walter Bor thinks that, "much of this is academic, since
people flock into cities in vast numbers, regardless of whether
authorities regard this as desirable or not." Governments in
Developing Countries will have to continue to face such problems.
There is much more need for intersectorial investment, in order
to make the most effective use of scarce financial resources,
than for worries about optimum city size and in-migration. This
argument lends force to the idea that rural-urban migration does
not necessarily have to hurt the growth of Third World cities,
but it is tacitly accepted that the growth must be controlled and
directed. Thus letting metropolitan areas expand may also be an
alternative.
POSSIBLE COSTS OF EXTENDING THE CITY.
Available evidence does not support the inference that urban
concentration is economically more advantageous than urban
deconcentration -- referring to population and necessary
services. Thus the question of whether it is better to
decentralize or concentrate activities at an acceptable cost
needs to be examined.
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The lIterature that exists on urban growth emphasizes
increase in urban costs as population increases. In practice, the
costs examined are the direct costs to public authorities of the
particular services. Cost per capita of the urban population
varies widely between cities of the same size because of its
composition rather than size of population which is likely to
determine both cosLs and products eg. a city, with a majority of
its population showing high rates of unemployment is unlikely to
present the same characteristics as one with a low percentage.
Service, manufacturing, and heavy industries, high employment
among the population are among the factors that contribute to the
tax bases of the cities. Logically their absence will spell
varying degrees of "poverty" to cities.
Nigel Haris suggests that "net marginal product per head".
rather than mere population size, seems more likely "to offer a
better guide on optimal sizes [for cities) than the movement of
costs." However, "even if we accept the unreality of the
exercise, it is by no means clear that the marginal costs of
public services per urban dweller increase significantly over a
range of city size nor that cities [according to the theory of
the firm] face a u-shaped cost curve." (30)
In the case of the United States though, it was found that
even where per capita municipal expenditures increased this was
not clearly attributable to increasing population. Save for a few
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exceptionS, Variation in per capita expenditures are not stronglv
associated with population size, but rather with some measure of
per capita income -- fiscal capacity, "available resources" or
per capita productivity [HarrisN.1978).
However, per capita productivity and income both appear to
increase with population size [four times faster- in comparison
with those examples where per capita local government expenditure
increases with size CHarrisN.,19783.
Many municipal systems are based on one or very few central
sources, for example, a simple sewage treatment plant, a single
electric generating station, gas source or central telephone
exchange. Therefore distribution lines to all parts of the city
emanate from these central sources according to Hufbauer and
Servern. Their diagram attempts to demonstrate the costs
associated with providing these services.
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CENTRAL SOURCES
Schematic utility distribution system when urban area is an
important cost factor according to G.C. Hufbauer and B.W.
Servern.
57
As the illustration suggiests, distribution liInes are
represented by isosceles triangles. We can consider the tip ot
the triangle to be at the fringe of the service area while the
base is at the central source. G.C. Hufbauer and B.W. Servern
advance that, "service capacity of the distribution system is
proportional to the summed width of the distribution lines at
their base." (31),
They proposed that. capital and operating costs of the
distribution system, on the other hand, are proportional to the
surface areas of the distribution lines." (32) Therefore the
larger the surface area, the greater the quantity of pipe or
cable which must be employed -- with obvious implications for
cost. Since the area of a triangle is the base times the length
[or height] times one hal-f, the surface area of the distribution
lines will increase with length, when the base-width [and hence
overall service capacity] is held constant. The correlation here
is that when development is disperse cost will be augmented,
while the opposite [high density development] is advantageous.
Hufbauer and Servern ingeniously argue that if the "total
length of distribution lines is proportional to the urban
geographic area, it will follow that capital and operating costs
will increase with area." This economic model, if it could be
borrowed for a moment, then applied to any Developing Country
would also logically hold true. Other research has pointed also
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in that direction.
Ludlow advanced some twenty years ago that, "Sprawling urban
growth at the fringes, strung out along highways or scattered in
haphazard and partially built subdivisions, is exceedingly costly
to service with streets, utilities, schools and other public and
private facilities."
Ludlow's study also showed that higher building densities
imply lower utility and service costs when the complete utility
system is laid down Ein a "package"] at the time of neighboring
constructions. This would suggest that if sites and services
projects were to be implemented, extra attention should be given
to global planning and phasing, piece-meal development and
planning would be costly. The same can be said of sewage disposal
systems, which are found to be cheaper per dwelling unit to
provide service for a high density subdivision than a low density
subdivision. The study further suggested that the cost of other
municipal systems might also increase with greater geographic
dispersion.
The total cost of municipal services for a fiscal year
divided by the total number of population gives the average cost
of services per capita in a city. The average Ecost] will, of
course, differ widely according to whether the region is
developed or under-developed.
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Understandably, it a region is poor the average cost Con
paper] for necessary services would be the same but the charges
would differ significantly. Therefore one would have to be
heavily subsidize by government while the other will be more
Self-sufficient.
On the other hand, analysis of local costs of services per
capita, which is the relative comparison of a region with its
nation, found that municipal costs in large cities are relatively
higher than those of smaller cities. When considering the
efficiency of municipal services in relation to city size, the
experts agree that their efficiency should increase with
increasing city-size to a point of diminishing returns, with an
optimum size somewhere between the extremes.
Municipal costs per capita are related to costs of individual
public services. Individual Public Services Cost vary widely
between Developed and Developing Nations since standards of
living, quality of services required, and tax bases differ.
Golany advanced that "a region can give its habitants an
adequate range of Ecommercial] services when the population of
its principal city is somewhere in the neighborhood of 100,000 to
200,000." (33) Since the significance of the Costs of Public
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ervices- per capita and the efficiency of these services related
more to city size than any other factor, such services would
constitute a small part of a city's economy, and are not major
economic forces in a self sustained city with a sound economy.
Another factor that contributes to high municipal costs is
crime. Big cities have a larger proportion of crime than small
ones. This makes the cost of social infrastructure Epolice or
other security services] required in large cities proportionately
higher than in small ones, this number will increase
incrementally with city sizes. Golany also wrote, "it may be
generalized that the large city not only experiences a greater
relative amount of crime, but also pay proportionately more
heavily for it." (34)
Finally, it should not be argued that there is a optimal city
size -For Lesser Developed Countries because each country's
geographical region has its own particular scale and criteria and
are a synthesis of cultural, social, functional and economic
factors.
CONCLUSIONS
New Towns are more expensive for LDCs than their sites and
services alternative but perhaps the argument should not be one
of mutually exclusive choices [between sites/services and new
townl3, but a lesson drawing comparison offering the best of both
concept. A composite solution may be the answer.
However, they appear much too expensive relative to other
options available to LDCs, such as sites and services at present.
Another important reason usually cited for their considerable
costs is high standards over planning. It would seem that LDC's
want to build new towns better than their counterparts in the
developed countries. Another is a disappointing lack of job
opportunities because of the difficulty in attracting industries
there. They are also very expensive in the provision of
infrastructure, because new fixed expenditures are costly. The
benefits they provide in the short-run have positive
repercussions of too few people.
Their planning tends to be sectorial with little emphasis on
inter-sectorial planning. The leverage of massive funds for new
towns investments make them costly for Developing Countries. It
is therefore a great financial burden to bear at their early
stages of development and the opportunity costs are great.
However, fact remains that new towns can be effective tools
in comprehensive planning and should not be totally ruled out in
the long run. The case of Egypt provides a good example of an
absolute necessity for new towns. If employed, they should be
placed far apart, encouraging "lateral physical expansions of
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both the older city and the new satellite towns involving heavy
infrastructure cost and diseconomies."
New towns should be a part of decentralized inter-sectorial
planning for LDCs. They may offer effective means of absorbing
the growing urban population through the provison of housing,
both for the middle and low-income. They may also provide relief
from the congested bigger cities. If they are constructed on the
outskirts of metropolitan areas, or elsewhere, where land is
cheaper, they may off-set some of the high costs that are
associated with new fixed expenditures for new towns. This cost
may be the single most important expenditure that is responsible
for the excessive out-lays necessary to build them.
The building of new towns when not comprehensively conceived
and well-planned, may worsen the situation -- sometimes
unexpectedly -- rather than improve on the problems they were
meant to solve.
Presently., LDCs can only afford well planned and consolidated
expansion programs for sites and services and not new towns.
Sites and services seem a cost-effective way of dealing with the
increasing urban population and the little available data
demonstrate their relative inexpensiveness [World Bank,19743
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mites and services offer many advantages. They provide
shelter for the poor at minimal costs which can be further
lowered by attaining economies of scale through the large-scale
layinQ o-f infrastructure. This low cost ensures a more equitable
distribution of government funds assuring some form of upward
mobility for the poor. Sites and services may also be applicable
to all income groups. The approach is flexible and may be
designed with different types and availability of services at
varinQ intervals.
Perhaps the ideal solution, if one there is, should be the
incorporation of the comprehensive planning implications of new
towns with the cheapness of sites and services. A redefined
version of new towns, a composite of two otherwise independent
solutions, sites and services schemes with the concept of new
towns. The strength of this combination will come from the low
cost approach of sites and services, targeting low income groups,
and the comprehensive macro economic planning that should be
inherent in new town planning. This solution would target
essentially urban low income groups who are often unemployed, and
have no collateral or capital build-up for an investment in
permanent housing.
In planning such a composite new town, considerations would
be given to all economic strata and their interdependencies,
examining them carefully at microlevels, then incorporating them
in economic development strategies EssentiaIly the sites and
services aspect within the new town concept could work as
currently executed, i.e., serviced lots provided with basic
amenities and the future inhabitants working towards the
construction of their own shelter as a function of available
income and time.
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